究竟亞里斯多德如何看待構想力 (φαντασία, imagination)，這是亞 里斯多德哲學裡意見最為分歧的議題之一。有些學者認為亞里斯多德 談的是創造心靈圖像的能力，有些學者認為是解讀知覺內容的能力， 有些學者將它歸屬為知覺能力的一種，專門負責處理非典型知覺經 驗，也有些學者認為它是一種後知覺的能力，扮演綜合知覺與料的角 色。我在這篇論文裡嘗試回到亞里斯多德《靈魂論》第三卷第三章文 本本身，嘗試重新定位構想力的核心功能。我認為亞里斯多德看待構 想力為對於知覺內容做一般性後製處理的能力，這項後製處理我指的 是對於知覺的適切對象與知覺的共同對象形成解讀。而當我們把握構想力的核心功能在於解讀一般性知覺內容時，更能回過頭來理解創造心靈圖像與解讀知覺內容並非不相容，心靈圖像正是對於所獲取的知覺內容的解讀。

Some argue that Aristotle sees imagination (φαντασία) as a faculty of creating mental images, some argue that he sees it as a faculty of interpreting perceptual contents, others ascribe Aristotle’s imagination to the faculty of perception while maintaining that it deals mainly with non-standard perceptual experiences, and still others see it as a faculty of synthesizing the sense data we have acquired. In this paper I argue that Aristotle in De anima 3.3 sees imagination as a post-perceptual faculty in virtue of which the perceiver gives her or his interpretation of standard perceptual contents, and that the mental images we create is precisely what we interpret the perceptual contents to mean.