臺灣於1990年代初期由基層法官發起的司法獨立改革運動，獲得 相當大的進展。本文的目的是瞭解這些改革運動對於司法人事的衝 擊，並從委託代理人理論的角度出發，首先分析法院獨立改革對於既 有的司法行政體系所造成的制度與結構性衝擊；接著建構相關指標來 測量一、二審法院院長在1986〜2015年間的調動情況以及結構變化的 樣貌；最後則是追蹤改革派法官的生涯發展。透過實證資料的分析， 本文認爲在司法獨立改革的衝擊下，法院體系原有人事升遷的「升官 圖」，已經全面性的鬆動。改革派法官除了沒有遭到迫害之外，更活躍 於獨立改革後的司法行政體系。

Judges in the district courts initiated the Judicial Independence Reform Movement in Taiwan in the early 1990s. This article discusses the impact that the Judicial Independence Reform Movement had on matters of judicial personnel from the perspective of principal-agency theory. We first analyze the institutional changes of the judicial administration system caused by the independence reform of the courts. Second, we construct indicators to evaluate the changes of the appointment of chief justices in district courts and high courts from 1986 to 2015. Last, we argue that the promotion mechanism in Taiwan’s courts has radically changed due to the judicial independence reform. The reform-minded judges who initiated this movement were not punished by the existing judicial system. Also, we did not find that the regime shift had much impact on judicial appointments.