探討《莊子》的倫理內涵乃是本文的要旨，且立基在「主體」這個重要的 倫理概念。法哲列維納斯將倫理的原初起點放到他者身上，而不是自我主體的 自我立法，這樣的立論點來自他對主體主義的批判意識。這一層批判，能夠與 《莊子》產生一有機的跨文化對話，進而挖掘出具有當代意義的倫理內涵。《莊 子》對語言、禮和權力的批判，源自一種深刻的倫理關懷，特別是對於各種人 存在的差異的肯認。然而與列維納斯有別的地方在於，《莊子》的規範性根源， 是「同於大通」的「一」。在西方的哲學或宗教裏，「太一」（The one）的 概念經常與肯認人的存在是差異多元的理論有著尖銳的矛盾。然而，《莊子》 的「一」，不能用西方本體論的概念來理解，而必須是王夫之提出的「天均」 模式來解讀。本文透過《莊子》的天均模式來貫通「一」與「多」的問題，凸 顯出《莊子》一方面不斷強調萬物通一，但另一方面又不斷支離同一化的言論， 這兩者並行不悖，且互相辯證，共同交織出《莊子》的倫理特色。

The purpose of this study is to explore ethical implication of Zhuangzi, and it is based on the critical ethical concept, “subjectivity.” French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas referred the ethical origin to others instead of self-legislation of subjectivity. Such argument derives from his criticism on subjectivism. The critique leads to organic cross-cultural dialogue with Zhuangzi and thus unfolds the contemporary significance of the ethical implication in Zhuangzi. Criticism of Zhuangzi on language, manner and power originates from profound ethical concern, particularly from various different cognitions of human beings. However, the difference from Emmanuel Lévinas is that the regulated origin of Zhuangzi is a “one” from “merging with the Great Pervader.” In the Western philosophy or religion, “the one” tends to be completely contradictory to the theory of diverse human cognitions. Nevertheless, “one” in Zhuangzi should not be comprehended by Western ontology; it, instead, must be elaborated by “Tian Jun” model that is proposed by Wang Fuzhi. By “Tian Jun” model of Zhuangzi, this study associates “one” with “many” to illustrate Zhuangzi which, on the one hand, constantly emphasizes unification of all beings, but, on the other hand, continuously opposes the statement of unification. The two opposite statements coexist; they converse with each other and form the ethical features of Zhuangzi.