既有的荀子道德主體研究大多在知性的維度上強調行動 者對禮義的認知能力，然而，如果行動者沒有對禮義的内在要求，單 純的知性並不足以使禮義内化。特別地，以理性人假設為基礎的博弈 論道德推理的解釋力也是有限的。這凸顯出康德道德主體概念的局 限性，而要求在理性/感性之外尋找作為道德動機的第三維度。在荀 子，「有血氣之屬莫不有知」，此一「知」字所指並不限於一般意義 上的知覺，更在於人類之間的生命感通。「有血氣之屬莫知於人」， 這意味著人類的生命感通能夠使之衝破軀殼之私，產生普遍性的同 情/同理心，而這也正是道德動力的存有論基礎。另方面，基於血氣 的情感本身具有自在品格，須得經過主體的反思（「處仁以義」）達 到理性自覺才成之為真正的道德情感。

The existing research on Xunzi’s moral subject mostly emphasizes the agent’s cognitive ability, the dimension of intellectuality. However, if the agent does not have the inherent demand for morality, pure intellectuality alone cannot not make ritual internalization. It should be noted that the need for morality differs from the need for food, and “that which one does not have within oneself, one is sure to seek for outside” is not enough to explain the internal motivation of moral selfimprovement. This predicament highlights the limitations of Kantian moral subject and calls for the search for the third dimension of moral motivation beyond reason and sensibility. The so-called third dimension, which corresponds to Wertfuhlen in Scheler’s value ethics, corresponds to compassion (ceyin 惻隱）in Mengzi’s ethics and to the feeling of empathy in Xunzi’s ethics. For Xunzi, “among all the living things between Heaven and Earth, those that have blood and qi are to have zhi 知.” This zhi 知 refers not only to the general sense of awareness or perception, but also to the psychological ability of mutual interpersonal empathy among human beings. “Among all the creatures that have blood and qi, none has greater zhi 知口 than human”，therefore the intense empathy enables human to break through the selfish and narrow patriarchal feelings, to feel with all its kind, so as to develop universal empathy. Needless to say, this is exactly the moral basis for the possible existence. On the other hand, although Xunzi takes empathy as moral motivation, Xunzi’s concept of moral agent still fundamentally differs from Mengzi’s in two aspects. First, the emotion of “love one’s own kind” based on the zhi 知 of blood-qi has its own character of naturalness. In short, this emotion does not necessarily lead to moral values. That is the reason that Xunzi proposes “dwells in ren 仁 by means of yi 義” and insists that the natural emotion of “love its kind” can be taken as the true moral emotion only when it reaches the rational consciousness through the agent’s self-reflection. Second, based on the ontological basis of human empathy, mankind has the mental consciousness of how individuals should get along with each other whereas its content comes from acquired learning instead. Therefore, these different understanding of the moral agent correspondingly leads to two different ways of selfcultivation.