但印度教多或少地接受了靈魂作為道德行動和責任的軸心。然而，佛教是印度文化的宗教，而徹底否定了自我作為道德行動和責任軸心思想，並宣稱自己是非自我的。五個不斷變化的聚集體形成了人體。好的和壞的道德行為（業力）但肯定了道德及道德責任的存在。一個人根據他們之前的業力（行動）出生在好的或壞的境界。若自我作為道德及道德責任的基礎的話在佛教來看令人“這是一個自相矛盾的說法；如果沒有自我，誰承擔了行動的結果”。是否可以一起辯論anattā（非自我）和道德責任？本文以早期佛教的“非自我”（anattā）概念為基礎，探討兩個基本問題，第一是否非自我調和與道德責任的概念？第二，在生命中承受死亡的結果是什麼？或者，早期的佛教文本如何爭論業力的重生呢？

The concept of morality is grounded in most of ancient philosophical and religious schools around the world. It developed in many different ways and continued until modern days. Ancient Greek philosophers presupposed the existence of soul or entity through which moral judgments and responsibilities were measured. Hinduism is one of the most ancient religions from Indian civilization which, more or less, accepted soul as the axis of moral actions and responsibilities. However, Buddhism, a religion from Indian culture, thoroughly denied the ideas of soul or entity as an axis of moral actions and responsibilities and claimed anattā (not-self). Five changing aggregates together form the human body. The results of good and bad moral actions (karma) are deeply rooted in the Buddhist concept of rebirth. One is born in good or bad realm depending on their previous karma (action). The first notions come to mind is that ‘it is a self-contradicting statement; if there is not-self then who bears the result of actions. Is it possible to argue anattā (not-self) and moral responsibilities together? This paper investigates two fundamental questions based on the Early Buddhist concept of anattā (not-self), first, can the concept of not-self reconcile with moral responsibility? Second, what survives death to bear the results of karma in one’s life? Or, how do the Early Buddhist texts argue karmic rebirth?