美國沙賓法案404 款要求上市公司每年需自我評估財務報導之內部控制 是否有缺失，並要求會計師針對客戶之內部控制評估結果出具意見。本研究 旨在探討內部控制缺失對經理人權益薪酬誘因與公司風險性投資之影響。權 益薪酬誘因可能導致經理人過度投資進而掩飾財務報表，一旦公司之內部控 制出現重大缺失，董事會可能為了降低財務報表誤述之風險，而減少經理人 之權益薪酬誘因，進而減少風險性投資。研究結果發現，有內部控制重大缺 失（違反404 款）之公司，其經理人之權益薪酬誘因較低；此外，在控制權 益薪酬誘因後，內部控制有重大缺失之公司，有較低之風險性投資。最後， 若公司改善內部控制之缺失，董事會也會再度調升經理人權益薪酬誘因。本 研究提供證據顯示董事會在設計經理人權益薪酬結構與決定公司投資水準 時，會將內部控制品質納為考慮因素。

In this study we examine how CEO equity incentives and firms’ risk-taking behavior are influenced by material weaknesses in internal controls. We find that the disclosure of such material weaknesses is negatively associated with the vega and delta of CEO compensation, suggesting that firms with adverse SOX 404 opinions reduce equity incentives to discourage the CEO from taking excessive risks. Moreover, this association seems to be stronger for more severe company-level internal control weaknesses. In addition, we find that after controlling for the effect of equity incentives on risk-taking, firms receiving adverse SOX 404 opinions have less R&D and capital expenditure investment. Further remediation analysis shows that the boards not only make downward adjustments for CEO equity incentives and risky investments when internal controls are found to be ineffective, but also make upward adjustments when material weaknesses are remediated. Our study contributes to both the compensation and internal control literature by providing evidence that internal control quality plays a role in a board’s decision to design CEO equity incentives as well as the level of a firm’s risk-taking.