羞恥被理所當然地認為是一種道德情感或道德情緒，知羞恥被認為是一種人類美德。然而，從對「應當羞恥」的判斷中分析發現，「應當羞恥」這個判斷要成立，其實還有前提預設和條件限制，它並不直接導向羞恥或道德，「應當羞恥」與實然羞恥之間並不一致。羞恥的發生與人們對自我概念的判斷與認同關係密切，由於人們接受的自我概念具有特定的社會歷史時空義涵，因而，「應當羞恥」的要求只是相對地被接受和有效。只有當人們承認道德法則和道德主體之存在，並且認為道德法則本身是所有理性存在者都不可違背的，人們才有可能面對所有人提出「應當羞恥」的判斷，「應當羞恥」才可能具有普適性與普遍約束力。

In daily life, shame is moral affection or moral emotion, and being shamed is often moral virtue. However, from analysis of the judgment: “ought to be shamed”, we will find that this judgment contains presuppositions and conditions. The demand does not lead to personal shame or moral virtue, and “ought to be shamed” is not the same as being shamed. Occurring of shame seems to relate to people’s self-concept and self-identity. Different self-concepts, which are relating to specific communities and ages, have different effects on personal shame. The demand of “ought to be shamed” not always affect individuals. The demand is not always imperative. Only the moral laws and moral agents are aware and are recognized, then the demand of “should be shamed” as an imperative will be possible by the rational being.