本文利用循序談判賽局探討在品質異質的雙占價格競爭中,業外品 質技術擁有者的授權行為。本文得到: (1)如果新技術屬於利潤極大 化的業外廠商, 則當授權前的品質競爭不激烈, 新技術授權給高品 質廠商並收取策略授權金; 當授權前的品質競爭激烈, 但是新技術 提高品質有限, 以傳統授權金移轉技術給高品質廠商; 當授權前的 品質競爭激烈, 但是新技術可以大幅提升品質, 以傳統授權金移轉 技術給低品質廠商為最有利。(2) 如果新技術屬於政府, 政府會希 望將新技術移轉給低品質廠商; 當新技術與高品質差異不大時, 需 補貼低品質廠商使用新技術。

We analyze the optimal licensing strategy of an outside patent holder of a superior quality technology for a Bertrand duopoly with different product quality in a finite stage sequential bargaining game. Two types of fixed-fees are considered, a strategic one and the conventional one. If the new technology is owned by a revenue maximizing outsider, it is shown that the optimal licensing strategy is transferring the patent (1) to the original high quality firm with a strategic fixed fee when the quality difference between the duopoly is large enough, (2) to the original high quality firm with a conventional fixed fee when the quality difference is small and the new technology helps little, and ⑶ to the original low quality firm with a conventional fixed fee, otherwise. If the new technology is owned by a social welfare maximizing government agency, it is shown that transferring technology to the low quality firm is optimal and a subsidy is required in case the new quality is improved very little.