當代分析哲學對邏輯規則的論證正在經歷黑格爾式的轉向。這是由於，雖然塞拉斯批判分析傳統的表象主義錯誤地將康德的直觀與概念能力的合作視為經驗上可分的，這會導致了邏輯上的所予神話，但他的類似康德自我立法觀念的論證仍處在所予框架內。這促使布蘭頓以黑格爾式的實用主義批判康德式的邏輯所予，使邏輯規則成為自我意識交互協商的結果。然而，這雖擺脫了所予框架，但卻陷入黑格爾所謂的終止於虛無的懷疑主義。針對此，黑格爾的論證策略是自我意識以交互協商方式對自身的自否定，這會表明，邏輯規則既是世界和思維的邏輯結構，又是合法則性和合理性的語用規範。

Argumentation of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy on logical rules is experiencing the return of Hegelian thought. The reason is that Although Sellars argued that representationism of analytic tradition, which mistakenly took Kantian duality of concept and intuition as empirically separable, logically led to the myth of the Given, his argument, similared to Kant’s self-legislative conception, was still within the framework of the Given. This prompted Brandon to criticize Kantian Given of logic with Hegelian pragmatism. However, his argument is free from the framework, but it is caught in Hegelian so-called skepticism which always sees in its results only pure nothingness. In this regard, Hegel’s argumentation strategy is self-denial of self-consciousness by the way of interactive negotiation, which shows that the logical rules are not only the logical structure of the world and the mind, but also the pragmatic norms of lawfulness and rationality.