本文以「義」的歧義凸顯《荀子》廣義道德規範的兩種性質。文中檢視歷來章句註釋，討論晚近東西方學者的詮釋，指出「義」在《荀子》不同脈絡中，有時表達以「禮義」為代表的行為法則或原則，有時表達某種道德能力。此二種意義之並存，彰顯出《荀子》廣義道德規範除重視道德傳統之價值外，亦重視道德傳統所需之個人道德能力。如此的詮釋乃嘗試為以《荀子》典籍為基礎之道德哲學發展作準備。

The ambiguity of yi in the Xunzi highlights two features of the nature of broad-sense moral norms embodied in the text. This paper, by examining traditional exegeses and reconsidering recent interpretations by scholars of both East and West, proposes that yi in different contexts of Xunzi are rendered as rules of conduct or principles as well as certain kind of personal moral ability. The coexistence of these features manifests the emphasis of not only the value of moral tradition but also personal moral ability, which is necessary to moral tradition. This attempt seeks to pave the way for future developments of moral theories based on the Xunzi.