康德於《單純理性限度內的宗教》（Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft，1793）指出人格性本身（die Persönlichkeit selbst）乃伴隨與之不可分的敬重之道德法則理念，在《實踐理性批判》（Kritik der praktischen Vernunft，1788）說明敬重是對法則的敬重，是一種通過理智發揮效用的情感，源自純粹實踐理性。海德格對情感與敬重的，於存有論上闡釋道德情感與人格性（海德格稱之為人的本質、主體性）的關係。本文主要討論海德格在《康德與形上學問題》（Kant und das Problem derMetaphysik，1929）與《現象學基本問題》（Die Grundfrage der Phänomenologie，1975）對康德的道德情感與敬重概念進行現象學式之詮釋，以瞭解海德格有關敬重的觀點，進而釐清海德格如何將敬重與人的本質建構關聯起來，藉以進一步瞭解敬重對人的本質與實際的自我之構成有何重要性。

In “Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason” (Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793), Kant points out that personality itself (die Persönlichkeit selbst) always comes along with the idea of a moral law of respect (Achtung) which is intelligence affecting feeling caused only by pure practical. And Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of feeling and Achtung elucidates the ontological relation between moral feeling and personality (Heidegger calls this the essence of the human or subjectivity). This paper discusses Heidegger’s Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik and Die Grundfrage der Phänomenologie, specifically, the phenomenological interpretation of moral feeling and the concept of Achtung. The purpose of this paper is to understand how Heidegger relates Achtung to the essential constitution of being of the human, and thereby to grasp the significance of Achtung for the actual construction of the self.