在面對風險轉換案例的時候，一般人直覺上覺得，這些案例顯示，諸如風險這類的實用因素（pragmatic factors）對我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識，扮演非常重要的角色。這個觀察似乎會跟智性主義（intellectualism）的主張有所衝突。根據智性主義，當我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識的的時候，實用因素並不是需要考量的因素。這篇文章發展一個知識判斷理論，可以調和我們對風險轉換案例的直覺判斷跟智性主義的衝突。筆者將論證，實用因素不會直接影響我們的知識判斷，而只會通過影響我們的知性角度（epistemic perspective），間接地影響我們的知識判斷。

The stakes-shifting cases suggest that pragmatic factors such as stakes play an important role in determining our intuitive judgments of whether or not S knows that p. This seems to be in conflict with intellectualism, according to which pragmatic factors in general should not be taken into account, when considering whether or not S knows that p. This paper develops a theory of judgments of knowledge status that reconciles intellectualism with our intuitive judgments regarding the stakes-shifting cases. I argue that pragmatic factors affect only our epistemic perspectives, i.e., the ways in which we evaluate S’s epistemic position. Therefore, pragmatic factors only have an indirect impact on our judgments of knowledge status.