本文考察了胡塞爾《邏輯研究》時期的感覺意向性理論，指出該理論以對象化行為為基礎。而海德格爾及拉特克里夫（Ratcliffe）、戈爾迪（Goldie）等人分析了情緒現象之後，認為存在著一類比對象化行為更為基礎的「生存感覺」——它是指向作為整體之世界的身體意向性，而且為對象化行為及其意向性奠定了方向。在此基礎上，本文進一步檢討了胡塞爾後期關於感觸現象的發生分析，指出胡塞爾修正了前期的感覺意向性理論，並對感覺意向性的發生過程及其結構要素給出了更為精細的說明。

Husserl’s theory of feeling intentionality in the V. Logical Investigation has been accused of being founded upon objectifying intentionality and cannot do justice to feelings such as “mood” in Heidegger. On the other hand, Heidegger and, in his wake, Ratcliffe argue that there is a sort of “existential feeling” that is pre-objectifying in kind and it is in nature a bodily intentionality that directs itself at the world as such. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, I examine Husserl’s genetic analysis of affection and argue that Husserl revises his early theory of feeling intentionality and his position turns out to be akin to Heidegger’s; second, pace Heidegger and Ratcliffe, I argue that Husserl’s detailed analysis of affection serves to better articulate the evaluative and the embodied feature of feeling intentionality.