本文分析臺灣建構形成短工補償制度的影響因素，以及衍生的制度運作後果。研究發現，政府宣稱基於「降低道德風險」與「減少財務負擔」的因素，因此設計了「高標準的就業保險失業率作為啟動門檻」與「緊縮資格條件」制度，不僅限縮了短工補償制度的社會保障範圍，而且導致短工補償制度難以啟動實施。而這種獨特的制度設計方式，衍生的制度運作後果是：在「短工補償制度難以啟動實施」、「解僱保護制度功能有限」、「失業給付制度要求雇主負擔義務少」等三項制度共同構成的制度環境下，促使雇主偏向選擇解僱勞工，即使有部分雇主選擇實施縮短工時措施，但是往往迫使勞工處於一種「勞資協商不對等」的處境，只能被迫同意雇主實施的縮短工時措施，同時在短工補償制度難以啟動的情況下，導致雇主無法申請薪資補助，縮減工時勞工無法獲得薪資補助，因而難以達到平衡實踐社會保護與經濟功能的政策目標，成為當前臺灣短工補償制度在實踐上所面臨的主要難題。建議刪除以「就業保險失業率」作為啟動門檻的規定，改採取「企業提出因經濟景氣衰退而訂單縮減與獲利明顯減少之證明」作為企業可以實施縮短工時措施的基本認定標準，再以「同一企業組織縮減工時勞工人數的下限達到20% 以上」作為啟動門檻。

This article aims to analyze the influence factors of short-time compensation institution and analyze the institutional outcome in Taiwan. The main finding is that short-time compensation were designed follows the “high criteria employment insurance unemployment rate as start threshold” and “tighten eligibility criteria”, bringing forth short-time compensation not only limit the scope of social protection but also cannot start to implemented. The institutional outcome is that employer preference dismissed workers in the context of “short-time compensation cannot start to implemented” link to “employer’s low obligations were required by the unemployment benefit institution” and “limited function of employment protection institution”, even some employer choose to implemented short-time measure, but workers cannot receive short-time allowance because the “high criteria start threshold”. The suggestions as follow: delete the employment insurance unemployment rate as start threshold, adopt the “proofs of company profit loss due to economic depression” as the criteria that employer implemented the short-time measure.