2008年金融海嘯對全球經濟所造成的負面衝擊至今仍然存在，為維持金融市場穩定，避免歷史重演，有關金融危機之探討及相關的金融法規改革也持續進行中，當中又以美國政府制定之Dodd-Frank法案和巴塞爾委員會提出的巴塞爾資本協定III最為大家所熟知。本研究聚焦在2008年金融海嘯前後時期，採用2001年第2季至2015年第1季的美國銀行控股公司資料，探討金融海嘯後銀行的放款行為是否有所改變。實證結果指出在金融海嘯發生之前，銀行的資本適足率對銀行的貸款成長有正向的影響，當銀行資本適足率愈高時，銀行放款成長率也愈大，但在金融危機過後，銀行資本適足率對貸款成長的影響大幅度減少，資本比率對於放款成長的正向影響較不顯著。整體而言，本研究結果顯示在金融海嘯之後，銀行的放款行為較金融海嘯發生之前更為謹慎保守，應和銀行本身的自我約束及需遵循更為嚴格的相關法規有關，也隱含著在金融海嘯後所進行的一連串金融法規改革對於銀行的營運行為確有影響。

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, bank behavior and banking supervision have been criticized, prompting a series of regulations, such as the Dodd–Frank Act and Basel III reforms. This study focuses on the periods before and after the 2008 financial crisis and examines whether the banks’ lending behavior changed after the 2008 crash. We use a sample composed of U.S. bank holding companies during the period from 2001Q2 to 2015Q1 and find that the effect of capital ratio on loan growth declines dramatically after the financial crisis compared to that before the crisis. The results suggest that after the financial crisis, lending behavior may be restricted by the banks themselves and by the stricter regulations. Our evidence also implies that the regulation reforms might really have an impact on banks’ behavior.