本文論述王充命論具有因果關係，及與因果環節相應的時間排序，並由此因果關係與時間觀，本文主張關於王充命論涉及之必然性與偶然性爭議的「命定論與適偶說是否相容」，及牽涉命論是否與氣論思想不一致的「氣與命何者為較根源概念」的問題，皆無不相容與不一致。由因果關係視之，氣為命論最根源的原因，命定是稟氣以後形成的狀態，適偶為不同遭遇，彼此適值成偶的說明，所以命定不包含結果的必然決定，適偶也非偶然性意涵，所以命定論與適偶說無涉及必然性與偶然性爭議的不相容問題。另外，就氣作為最根源原因而言，命論與氣論也無不一致，皆以氣為最根源的概念。其次由時間觀視之，王充命論雖具有以未來結果當作原因的時間錯置，導致結果預定的錯衍，然命定之時早於結果成為事實之時，仍為命論實質內容，所以命定仍非結果必然決定義，而適偶發生在適值偶遇之時，雖由因果事件聯結無法確定，而有偶然性之感，然命論的因果決定關係確具，所以適偶仍非偶然性義。另外，由於稟氣早於命定，所以氣當為命論中更為根源的概念無疑。

This paper argues that Wang Chong’s theory of Ming has a dimension of causality and a corresponding temporal order, and from this perspective I propose that there is no incompatibility between Ming-Ding and Shih- Ou concerning necessity and contingency, nor any inconsistency between Ming and Qi concerning their priority. Causally speaking, Qi is the ultimate origin in the theory of Ming, while Ming-Ding is the resulting state after Qi, and Shih-Ou is an account of different things meeting in a coincidence. So the concept of Ming-Ding does not contain the notion of necessary determination, nor does the concept of Shih-Ou the notion of contingency, and consequently there is no incompatibility between Ming-Ding and Shih- Ou. Moreover, so far as Qi is the ultimate origin, there is no inconsistency concerning Ming and Qi about their priority. Temporally speaking, though Wang Chong’s theory of Ming contains a certain temporal disorder in taking the future as a cause to pre-determine the result, the time of determination is still prior to the time of happening, and hence Ming-Ding still falls short of necessity. On the other hand, though coincidence occurs when things happen to meet, thus acquiring a sense of contingency underdetermined by causal connections, coincidence still falls short of contingency. Moreover, as Qi is prior to Ming-Ding, Qi should be taken as the ultimate origin beyond any doubt.