本文論證《修身西學》中在情感的道德作用問題上，一方面體現了亞里斯多德主義中理智對情感的認知規訓層面，但另一方面，也體現著中國孟子傳統中性本善的傾向。這兩者可能存在一定程度的內在矛盾，但經過進一步解釋卻可以發展出融合互補的理論形態。所以本文伴隨著《修身西學》文本的分析，也嘗試探索它背後代表的兩種傳統融合的可能性。

In this paper I argue that the moral function of emotions in Xiu Shen Xi Xue presents the Aristotelian doctrine of non-rational part of soul listening to reason on the one hand, and the Mencius’ doctrine of human nature essentially good on the other. But these two aspects may possibly have internal conflict. Further explanation is needed to make them compatible. So alongside with analyzing the text of Xiu Shen Xi Xue, I also try to explore of the possible interfusion of two different cultural tradition.