（哲學）思想實驗是哲學研究大量使用的重要方法，本文探討的對象是思想實驗知識論的三個語意進路理論——Williamson，Ichikawa / Jarvis，並旁及Grundmann / Horvath——強調理性直覺的Malmgren會一併討論。思想實驗的知識論要能說明我們實際上如何思考並判斷思想實驗，而不僅是提供新的概念遊戲。不同於一般對此三理論的討論方式，本文企圖建立思考思想實驗的後設原則，據此分為三個主要部分：第一節簡介三個理論的語意特性；藉由彼此的評論，第二節處理思想實驗的語意內容與證立性，經由不同理論的語意特性，提出思考思想實驗的語意後設原則；第三節探討我人實際判斷思想實驗的過程，提供規範原則，並論證暨解釋為何較難接受Ichikawa / Jarvis和Grundmann / Horvath的二個理論。最後是簡短的結論。

(Philosophical) thought experimentation is one major methodology employed by philosophical research. This article studies one particular semantic approach of epistemological theories of thought experiments—that is, Williamson’s, Ichikawa and Jarvis’, and Grundmann and Horvath’s accounts; also discussed is a different approach advanced by Malmgren focusing on rational intuition. Epistemological theories of thought experiments are supposed to account for how we actually think through and judge thought experiments, not just providing some new conceptual games. Different from the standard way discussing the above three theories, this article evaluates the meta-principles of how we come to consider thought experiments. The first section is a brief introduction of the semantic features of the above theories. The following section is about the semantic content and justification / justifiedness of thought experiments. By means of the comparison of the proposed semantic contents given by the above theories, two meta-principles governing how we think about thought experiments are given. The third section further discusses the actual process of how we raise judgements of thought experiments. Based on the reasoning and reasonableness of a normative principle, it is explained and argued why Ichikawa and Jarvis’ and Grundmann and Horvath’s theories are less acceptable, followed by a brief concluding remark.