勞思光(1927-2012)提出決意自主的概念，批判新儒學未能解決人之善惡問題，認為善惡問題須在一主體之抉擇行動中才能被理解。北宋二程（程顥1032-1085；程頤1033-1107）只視氣稟為實現道德價值之載體的一個存在條件，當代學者卻將氣稟延伸並詮釋為干擾心體之至惡因。氣稟作為存在條件，只涉及人之實踐行動的難與易，此已為張載(1020-1078)所知，張載雖以順或不順性體之意識闡釋人之善惡，但未能揭示出這意識之主體為何。劉宗周(1578-1645)對此則有獨到看法：人欲並非人之至惡因，就倫理上而言，人必先自主意於放失其心，而後人欲之角色才能被理解，故此自主意之意識才是惡之根源處，明知何事可為卻偏不為之自欺，它屬於一自我。藉劉宗周的自主意概念，人承責之可能性才能被理解。

Lao Sze-kwang 勞思光 referenced the autonomy of decision-making to criticize Neo-Confucian thought, arguing that Neo-Confucians failed to provide a solution to the problem of good and evil because they maintained that it could only be understood via a subject’s decision to act. In the Northern Song dynasty, the Cheng brothers (Er Cheng 二程) conceived of the material nature (qibing 氣稟) as an existential condition for the realization of moral values; however, several of their contemporaries interpreted it as the source of mental agitation and evil. As Zhang Zai 張載 pointed out, the Cheng brothers’ position only concerned the difficulty or ease of human moral practice. Although Zhang explained human evil as deriving from the decision to either follow or contravene the consciousness of the nature, he failed to reveal the subject of this consciousness. The Ming dynasty thinker Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 offered a unique perspective on this issue, arguing that human desire was not the cause of evil because human desire always stood ethically behind the decision to give up one’s original mind. For Liu, the root of evil was nothing but the consciousness of this self-decision. The decision to do evil meant that a human being was aware of what should and could be done, but willingly refused to do it. This resulted in self-deception, which belongs to the ego, and it is only through this concept that the possibility of human responsibility can be understood.