人道和人的尊嚴一直是漢娜．阿倫特政治哲學關注的核心問題。她將人的尊嚴理解為人在與他的同伴一同行動時，展現出的潛能和能力。同樣地，人道對她來說也不是一個抽象的概念，而是密切關聯到人類團結和共同世界的現實。由於多數對阿倫特思想的研究都集中於《人的境況》中所包含的現象學基礎，而且傾向於忽略她思想中來自基督教傳統的資源，造成了阿倫特關於人道所持的原創性觀點未得到足夠重視。藉由返回到她1929年關於奧古斯丁的博士論文，本文將提供一種被其現象學解讀和政治解讀所忽略的、阿倫特的世俗人文主義解讀。文章從三個部分展開：第一部分透過阿倫特博士論文所提出的鄰人之愛的問題，來闡明她對人類同伴的關注；在第二部分中，她所謂「愛這個世界」的含義將在博士論文中得到考察。第三部分將指出，這一基於奧古斯丁論文解讀的一個效果是，讓阿倫特充滿爭議性的「惡之平庸」獲得更為清晰的理解。

Human dignity and humanity are central concerns in Hannah Arendt’s political thought. For Arendt, human dignity is understood as the potentialities or capabilities of human beings manifested with fellow human beings acting in concert. Humanity is not an abstract concept but closely linked with human solidarity and the reality of the common world. Since most scholarly attentions are given to Arendt’s phenomenological theory contained in The Human Condition, and those interpretations tend to ignore resources of her thought from Christian tradition, Arendt’s original sustained vision about humanity has not received enough importance. By going back to these sources in her 1929 dissertation on Augustine, this article will provide an interpretation of secular humanism in Hannah Arendt, which has been obscured, by its phenomenological and political interpretation. The paper consists in three parts. In the first part, Arendt’s concern with fellow human beings is clarified from the problem of neighborly love proposed in her dissertation. In the second section, the meanings of her “love of the world” or amor mundi are explored in the dissertation. In the third part, this article will argue that one of the consequences of this interpretation based on her Augustine dissertation, is to give her famous characterization of Eichmann as “banal” more light than heat.