迄今，笛卡爾哲學被視為現代哲學的起點，但其倫理學在學界仍存爭議。關於他提出的Morale par Provision，學界至少有三種不同的標準解讀，分別為臨時性的「權宜之計」，非臨時性的「先決的道德」或一系列先行確立的「無條件的義務」，以及與「完美的道德」相對的「不完美的道德」。在筆者看來，這些解讀共同的問題在於沒有超越地去理解他的倫理思想，這正是第四種新的現象學的解讀要表明的：在笛卡爾哲學中，Morale par Provision是以信仰或信念為前提的道德，Morale Parfaite是以科學或認識為前提的道德。兩種道德是笛卡爾倫理學的一體兩面，作為既相互獨立又相互闡釋的兩種道德，均為目的，而非手段。

Descartes’ philosophy has been regarded as the starting point of modern philosophy, but its ethics is still controversial in the academic circles. At least three different standard interpretations of Morale par Provision advanced by him are given, such as a temporary expediency, a non-temporary “pre-definite morality” or a series of pre-established “unconditional obligations”, and a kind of “imperfect morality” as opposed to “perfect morality”. From my point of view, the same problem of these interpretations is that they do not understand his ethical thoughts transcendentally. This is what the fourth phenomenological interpretation would show. That is in Cartesian philosophy, Morale par Provision is a morality based on faith or belief, and Morale Parfaite is a morality based on science or knowledge. The two kinds of morals are the two sides of Descartes’ ethics. As two kinds of morals which are independent and interpretative for each other, they are both ends, not means.