亞里斯多德所說的幸福（ἐυδαιμονία）只是在於直觀理性的沉思活動，還是亦包含著合乎倫德德性的活動和其他的善？現代學者們對這個問題形成了兩種解釋，理智論和包容論（intellectualism and inclusivism），二者都面臨自身的解釋困境。事實上，亞里斯多德是在兩種不同的語境或視角中論及幸福的，一是實現活動的語境，二是生活形式的語境。本文的旨趣在於，借助這種區分重新思考沉思生活與倫理活動之間的關係，通過對《尼各馬可倫理學》中的核心文本的分析來印證沉思活動與倫理活動之間的相通性或相似性。理論智慧與倫理活動的實踐智慧就實現活動來說都植根於靈魂的理性部分，二者是同源共生的，而非判若雲泥；就生活形式來說，沉思生活必然也將合乎倫理德性的活動含納其中，因為人是複合性和政治性的存在。基於這種新的包容性解釋視角，亞里斯多德對幸福的一致性理解圖景便彰顯出來。

The question, what Aristotle intends to say with the concept of happiness (ἐυδαιμονία), plays a central role in the ethic’s theory of Aristotle. Does he mean that the happiness lies only in the contemplative activity or also includes other goods, esp. the activities according to the ethical virtues? As well-known, there are two different approaches to the question, one is the dominant intellectualism and the other is the inclusivism. The reason for the controversy seems lying in the fact, that both neglected that Aristotle spoke of εὐδαιμονία in two different senses or contexts: one is in the sense of actuality, the other in the sense of the possible form of life. By means of this distinction, the article is trying to reconsider the relationship between the contemplative life and the ethical activities, and through the analyses of the central passages from EN X 7-9 and other works, we find that both the theoretical wisdom used in the contemplation and the practical wisdom formed in the ethical activities are rooted in the intellective soul, and thus con-generous and analogous in the sense of actuality on the one hand. On the other hand, we find that the contemplative life necessarily includes the ethical activities based on the fact, that the human being is a compound and political being. From such a new perspective of inclusive interpretation, Aristotle’s unitary understanding on ἐυδαιμονία could be brought into light.