本文乃處理象山二心為一之說，以發掘其倫理學意涵及其哲學史根源。二心即是道心與人心；而所謂為一，乃表二心間之統一。依唐君毅之詮釋，視之為同一心之或升或降即表此統一；其次乃依象山文本，筆者視這統一乃表示為決意於或順或逆其本心間的人自我之概念，因而所謂順逆本心即只是人自我之心意識中的兩端緒而已。合此，人自我若順其本心即是其心之上升；反之，若違逆之，則是同一心之下降；在這自我概念下，即能說明人之道德規範與歸責之可能性。此本心與人心之分別，乃是對其概念進行先驗分析而至者，以便能揭示本心概念之特質。但此本心概念並未涵蓋人道德意識之整全，而只這整全中的一部分，因這概念未蘊含犯惡之可能性，所以未能說明犯惡者自身及對其惡之可能歸責。而這人自我之概念所表者乃其心意識之兩端，這才表道德意識之整全：本心是我的本心，我亦是那犯惡者，由是，這自我乃是善惡之可能性之最高主體。以上之分析乃在象山所引用的孟子文本中所建立者，也即是，象山二心為一之說，不論其倫理學意涵抑或其哲學史根源，乃藉孟子學之連結中所達至者。

In this paper I discuss Xiangshan’s unity of two minds in order to explore its ethical implications and the roots of its philosophical history. The two minds mean Dao mind and human mind, and the so-called one mind is the unity of the two. And this unity in my paper is regarded as the one-mind’s rise or fall by the interpretation of Tang Junyi（唐君毅）, and as a concept of self to combine two minds in according to Xiangshan’s text, the unity is a self who makes a decision for or against his original mind, thus it is two beginnings of the same mind. In a word, the mind rises when the self’s decision conforms with his original mind, and the same mind falls when his decision violates it. In according to the concept of self the possibility of human’s moral norm and responsibility can be explained. The distinction between the two minds is established by a transcendental analysis of their respective conceptual content, and the point is to reveal the character of original mind. But the concept of original mind doesn’t demonstrate the whole but only a part of moral consciousness, because it doesn’t imply the possibility of evil and thus fails to explain the concept of evildoer and the possible responsibility for his evil. The concept of the self indicates the two beginnings of the human consciousness and as such constitute the whole of moral consciousness: the original mind is mine, and I am also the evildoer, thus the self is nothing but the ultimate subject for the possibility of good and evil. The above analysis is based on the Mencius text quoted by Xiangshan. That is, Xiangshan’s two minds in one, in both its ethical implications and philosophical history, is dependent on his interpretation of Mencius text.