Rolf-Peter Horstmann近作《康德之想像力》（Kant’s Power of Imagination），是針對「想像力」在康德學統下備受忽視的情況而作。這部102 頁的著作，仔細分析了《純粹理性批判》和《判斷力批判》中與想像力相關的內容，意圖從內部理順康德的想像力理論，並論證想像力在建構認知對象過程裡的獨特貢獻。他提出了「建構認知對象的兩階段模式」，闡明想像力在認知過程中獨一無二的功能與位置，並在此基礎上論證想像力是一種獨立、自足的認知能力。由於想像力是一種獨立認知能力，因此至少在理論哲學和知識論脈絡下，康德學者沒有忽視想像力的理由。

Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s recent work, Kant's Power of Imagination, is a response to the neglect of “the power of imagination” in the Kantian circle. In this 102-page book, Horstmann analyzes passages relevant to imagination in Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment in detail, with the aim of making Kant’s theory of imagination coherent. He argues for the unique contribution of imagination in the context of the constitution of cognitive objects. Horstmann proposes a “two-stage model of constructing cognitive objects” in his examination of the irreplaceable function and special position of imagination in the cognitive process, and from this, he argues that imagination is an independent, self-standing cognitive faculty. Since imagination is an independent cognitive ability, at least in the context of theoretical philosophy and epistemology, Kant scholars have no reason to ignore it.