2019年8月印度與巴基斯坦兩國再度因喀什米爾地區爆發衝突，印度國防部長拉傑納特・辛格揚言，未來印度不排除優先投入核武器進入戰場，暗示過往「不首先使用核武」政策將視情況調整。印度雖然在1974年即已進行核武試爆，不過當時在國大黨執政下，甘地與尼赫魯「非暴力」的精神一直影響著印度外交政策，直到1998年印度人民黨執政後，印度才正式公開成為核武國家，並且因違反《禁止核武擴散條約》規定，遭受美國長期的制裁，直到小布希為了戰略考量承認印度成為擁有核武俱樂部的成員地位。印度的核武實力浮上檯面，同時對中國的勢力增長十分憂心，本文主要論述印度在發展核武議題上，美國對印度政策扮演關鍵因素，印度欲透過與美國的合作取得「大國地位」的被認可，當中又因價值信念所呈現的糾結與轉折。

India’s strategic path towards nuclear weapons capability was so long. A legacy of India’s non-violent independence movement and diplomatic opposition to nuclear proliferation during the long premiership of Jawaharlal Nehru is the vital factor. On the other hand, India’s nuclear program meh as always been related to its search for recognition and respect in the eyes of the world. Indeed, the Indians viewed the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime as being deeply flawed. They believed that the regime perpetuated a world of inequality in which the existing nuclear powers enjoyed the benefits emanating from their possession of the ultimate weapon, while other states were forced to accept second-class status. In 2005, the Bush administration announced that it planned to offer India fuel and technical support for its civilian program me. There is little doubt that the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement has played an important role in facilitating the India and US rapprochement. The US has altered its position and change its domestic laws and convincing international agencies to alter their regulations in order to provide India with civil nuclear assistance. The agreement shows enormous strategic victory for India, however, the most political challenging aspects has been India’s domestic politics and sees it as reducing India’s freedom of action.