本文以德拉瓦州Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC為中心，說明德拉瓦州受託義務審查之晚近發展。Corwin見解之作成，雖係歷來德拉瓦州案例法延伸發展的結果，但亦與晚近之股東訴訟氾濫與機構投資人興起等風潮有關，而宣示經過知情且未受壓迫之股東決定所批准的交易，法院將以寬鬆的經營判斷法則審查。在後續的案例法發展中，德拉瓦州法院不僅著重於股東批准是否取得必要之資訊，以及該等決定之作成是否受到壓迫，而著有若干判決，亦對於控制股東之有無此一適用Corwin之前提問題，建構出一套判斷標準。本文觀察Corwin對於德拉瓦州受託義務審查架構之影響，並思考其中若干議題，此不僅有助益於我國受託義務理論之發展，相信對於我國現有規定之股東會撤銷事由及實質董事之認定，亦能有所啟發。

This article concentrates on Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC to explore the development of fiduciary law review in Delaware. Under Corwin, the informed shareholder rectification without coercion may shift the standard of review to the business judgment rule. Although Corwin is the extension of previous case law, it is associated with the recent trend of abusive shareholder litigation and the rise of institutional investors. In the rulings thereafter, the Delaware court focuses on whether the shareholder receives the information necessary to make the decision and whether their decision-making is coerced. Furthermore, the Delaware court constructs a standard to determine the existence of the controlling shareholder for the case in question, which is the threshold issue with respect to the application of Corwin. This article examines the influence of Corwin on Delaware’s review of fiduciary duty compliance and analyzes several related issues that might be helpful to development of Taiwan’s fiduciary with a view to providing insight into the shareholder’s remedy regarding the revocation of shareholder resolution and the determination of the de facto director under current law.