賽伯格逾越身體的邊際，挑戰了「人」的定義；《莊子》蘊含中國古典的技術哲學，具有「忘際」之化通物我界線的傾向。兩種思想大不相同，但不是完全沒有對話的可能：它們都面對了主體與邊際的命題，卻展現出相異的思想態度。若以哈洛威的〈賽伯格宣言〉為參照對象，來回顧臺灣學界的氣化論，將可突顯《莊子》物化主體的視野，進而反駁氣決定論。《莊子》以技藝為中介，推移物我的分際，使外物形成主體的親密義肢。透過賽伯格意象，有助於闡明《莊子》的批判潛力，其中亦有工夫。而「賽伯格莊子」這個詞語，則是對賽伯格的再賽伯格。

Cyborg theory intends to surpass the margins of the body and challenge the definition of “human.” Zhuangzi contains a classical Chinese philosophy of technology that aims to “forget the margin” and cross over the boundaries of subject and the other. Comparing the two thoughts, we know that cyborg theory is very different from Zhuangzi, but it is not entirely impossible to have a dialogue. They both face the concepts of subject and boundary, but show different thoughts and attitudes. This paper discusses Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto,” revisits the thesis of “qi-hua subject” in Taiwan’s academia, and then emphasizes Zhuangzi’s “objectifying subject.” By that, this paper refutes qi-determinism. I argue that Zhuangzi uses technics as an intermediary to move the boundary of subject and the other, so that object constitutes an intimate prosthesis. We can highlight the critical potentials of Zhuangzi by reading it with cyborg thoughts, and bring about a further implication for it— there is also gong-fu in cyborg. The term “cyborg Zhuangzi” thus means the recyborging of cyborg.