本文欲透過陽明後學歐陽南野與羅整菴的兩封答書內容，而來探討心學與理學這兩個學派之間的爭論；其中，由於雙方各以自己立場而檢視並答辯對方，以致於論辯的交集性不大。整菴站在理氣論的立場，視南野心學一系的良知是知覺，只就形上之氣而言，未能及於形上之天理，又其主張「儒者本天，釋氏本心」，視南野一系近於佛學。至於南野則認為朱子學的格物、讀書窮理說法未能及於良知，以致於有「道之遠人」之嫌，不能切近於身。雙方對《大學》「格物」之說各有詮釋，針鋒相對，亦由此見出兩派對於自家體系的堅守，如心即理或性即理之說。大致而言，雙方皆未契入對方而互相同情、了解，最後也就難以達成共識。關於整菴與南野此二封書信的爭辯，學界包括吳震、鄧克銘、林月惠與張學智教授等前輩皆曾論及，這篇文章則試圖對於雙方爭辯進行更全面的討論，以使朱、王之後心學與理學兩派的異同更加清晰、明朗。

In this article, we discuss the debate between the doctrine of mind and Neo-Confucianism through the correspondences between Ouyang Nan-ye and Luo Zheng-an. In these letters, they both examine and answer one another through their own positions, and therefore there is not much intersection in their arguments. From the position of the “li-qi theory,” Luo sees Ouyang’s idea of “conscience as perception” not achieving the metaphysical heavenly principle and his claim of “Confucianism founded on the heaven and Buddhism founded on the true mind” close to Buddhism. As for Ouyang, he sees Zhu Xi’s ideas of “investigating things and thoroughly probing the underlying principles” as not reaching the conscience but possibly making tao far away from rather than close to human beings. They have distinctive and contrary interpretations about the “investigation of things” from Great Learning, which shows their adherence to their respective philosophical frameworks, that is, mind as the principle and nature as the principle. In general, they can’t sympathize with one another, making it hard for them to reach any consensus. Some scholars, such as Wu Zhen, Deng Keh-ming, Lin, Yueh-hui and Zhang, Xue-zhi, refer to the debate in these two letters; this article is meant to discuss more thoroughly their arguments and illustrate further the similarities and distinctions between the doctrine of mind and Neo-Confucianism after the times of Zhu Xi and Wang Yang-ming.