本文主要闡釋Habermas所提出的雅努斯面容的真理構思。首先，筆者將釐清，Habermas的真理理論不是一種語意的真理理論，也不是真理的冗餘理論，更不是真理的符應理論，而是真理的共識理論，或更精確地說，是一種真理的論評理論。不過，該理論的理想交談情境之預設，遭受諸多的批評。於是，Habermas的真理理論又經歷了實用主義的轉向。因此，筆者將緊接著處理Habermas如何站在Kant式的實用主義觀念，反對新實用主義的真理理論，進而鋪陳Habermas有關雅努斯面容的真理概念。最後筆者將梳理他如何回應新實用主義與語言分析哲學家們的質疑與挑戰。

This article mainly deals with the Janus-Faced conception of truth proposed by Jürgen Habermas. First of all, I will clarify that Habermas’s theory of truth is neither a semantic theory and a redundancy theory, nor correspondence theory of truth, but a consensus theory of truth, more precisely, a discursive theory of truth. For Habermas, a true or rational consensus is defined as agreement in an ideal speech situation. But, the theoretical postulate of ideal speech situation has suffered a lot of criticisms. Thus, Habermas’s theory of truth has experienced a pragmatic turn. I will then explain how Habermas opposed the American neo-pragmatic theory of truth from the standpoint of Kantian pragmatism. Furthermore, I will analyze Habermas’s Janus-face concept of truth. Finally, I will sort out how he responded to the doubts and challenges of neo-pragmatism and language analysis philosophers.