篇名 | 論郎尼根之廣義經驗方法 |
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卷期 | 48:11=570 |
並列篇名 | On Lonergan’s Generalized Empirical Method |
作者 | 陳文祥 |
頁次 | 029-045 |
關鍵字 | 廣義的經驗方法 、 超驗 、 意向性 、 多瑪斯 、 康德 、 胡塞爾 、 Generalized Empirical Method 、 Transcendence 、 Intentionality 、 Thomas Aquinas 、 Immanuel Kant 、 Edmund Husserl 、 A&HCI |
出刊日期 | 202111 |
本文的主要目標在於討論郎尼根所建構的「廣義的經驗方法」,及其內涵、特徵與運作。郎尼根針對其哲學進路的建構,曾經對比多瑪斯、康德與胡塞爾之哲學立場,立足於「超驗」這一關鍵術語所派生出的理論定位,以證成其哲學方法。郎尼根從三者對超驗性與意向性的根本區辦出發,並對三個觀點提出其肯定與修正,藉此開展其所謂之廣義的經驗方法。本文首先試圖對其所揭三者之觀點,特別就超驗觀念,及與之不可分割的意向性觀念展開討論,其次闡明郎尼根對三者的批判與綜合,最後申論郎尼根的廣義經驗方法之所主要意涵。本文認為,其廣義的經驗方法為整合性地以植根於人心的求知意向性的超驗能力及可驗證的科學方法,郎尼根主張此一方法不僅可以解決主體與客體的鴻溝,更可統合真、善與宗教至同一整體。
This article is meant to discuss the content, features and operation of the generalized empirical method, which is constructed by Bernard Lonergan. To construct his own philosophical approach, Lonergan compares Aquinas’s, Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophical positions, which are founded on the theories derived from the key term, “transcendence,” in order to justify his philosophical method. After demonstrating the fundamental distinctions among these three philosophers in terms of transcendence and intentionality, Lonergan proposes his approvals and modifications of their perspectives, whereby to formulate his Generalized empirical method. In this article, we first show the three philosophers’ perspectives, especially those on transcendence and intentionality, as the latter is inseparable from the former. Then we explicate how Lonergan criticizes and synthesizes their perspectives; then we would finally state the major content of Longergan’s generalized empirical method. Succinctly, this is a scientific method that seeks to activate in an integrated way the transcendence and testability of one’s intentionality. Lonergan argues that this method is able to not only solve the gap between the subject and the object but also unify truth, good and religion.