本文目的在於探究北周慧影在《大智度論疏》的存有論立場。《大智度論疏》是漢傳佛教現存解釋《大智度論》的唯一文本，也是南北朝時期北方四論師所留存的文本，因此具有相當的研究價值。本文指出可從兩個層面理解慧影的存有論立場。第一，從世俗的結構中以緣起、無自性來說明存有事實之類似於反實在論的主張。但此種立場雖然否認了存有的實存性，但卻在緣起和合的脈絡下承認存有的暫存性，而與反實在論不同。第二，在勝義的結構中慧影賦予了「實相」存有承諾，使得此種立場類似於柏拉圖學說裡之的實在論主張，只是在慧影的解釋裡，存有並非分受於真實的共相而有。再者，本文也重構了慧影所處之南北朝時期的思想場景，發現慧影受到道安的影響，以涅槃師的佛性常住義以及地論師本自清淨的阿梨耶識來詮釋《大智度論》實相般若的概念。慧影此種詮釋的存有論傾向，乃是揉雜了南北朝時期北方佛教不同學派與經論之思想的結果。然而，本文作者認為慧影此種存有論立場或許不是當時佛教不同學派之思想對其產生絕對性的影響，而是詮釋者於不同經論體系間觀念的混用，造成了中觀哲學的詮釋在慧影身上發生轉變。

The purpose of this paper is to examine the ontological position of Huiying, a Buddhist commentator of the Northern Zhou dynasty (557–581), in his Dazhi du lun shu. This text is the only extant Chinese Buddhist commentary on the Dazhi du lun 大智度論 (Skt. Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa) and was a text preserved by the Northern Masters of the Four Treatises School 四論師 in the Southern and Northern dynasties; as a consequence, it has considerable research value for our understanding of Chinese Buddhism during this period. This paper argues that the ontological position of Huiying can be understood on two levels. First, he takes dependent origination and non-intrinsic-nature from the structures of conventional truth to illustrate that facts of existence are analogous to the assertions of anti-realism. However, though his position denies the substantiality of existence, it nevertheless acknowledges the temporality of existence in the context of dependent origination and unity, a point which differs from anti-realism. Second, within the structures of ultimate truth, Huiying assigns an ontological commitment to true original nature, bringing his position into alignment with Plato’s realism, but in Huiying’s explanation, existence is not derived from the ideal forms. Furthermore, by reconstructing Buddhist thought in the Southern and Northern dynasties in which Huiying was situated, we discover that he was influenced by Daoan 道安 and interpreted the concepts of reality (shixiang 實相) and wisdom (bore 般若, Skt. Prajñā) in the Da zhidu lun through his understanding of the Nirvana School’s 涅槃師 concept of the eternality of Buddha Nature and the Dilun School’s 地論師 concept of original purity of the store consciousness (aliyeshi 阿梨耶識, Skt. ālayavijñāna). This ontological disposition of Huiying’s interpretation is the result of fusing together the thought of different Northern Buddhist schools and their texts from the Southern and Northern dynasties periods. Nonetheless, this also suggests that the ontological position of Huiying is perhaps not the product of absolute influence from the thought of different Buddhist schools at that time. Instead, it was the result of an interpreter mixing together concepts from different scriptural and commentarial systems, which resulted in alterations to Huiying’s interpretations of Madhyamaka philosophy.