專業案件的審理仰賴法官對於技術細節的掌握，而其理解程度又受到法院的人力、時間等資源限制。本文將法官的技術理解決策納入訴訟模型，指出若法官花費更多心力於辨析技術細節，能促使訴訟雙方提出更多證據，進而提昇裁判品質。根據此基本性質，本文進一步分析兩項議題：第一，挪用有限法院資源於蒐集證據，將使法官理解技術程度下降，並削弱訴訟雙方提供證據的誘因。若法院蒐證能力不足，整體裁判品質將會下降；第二，若法官於審理過程中能揭露心證，可讓訴訟雙方據此調整蒐證策略，並在通常可滿足的數學條件下，提升社會福利。

To properly adjudicate a case characterized by technical details, a judge needs to spend considerable effort and resources to understand the relevant knowledge and evidence. Incorporating this element into a litigation model, private incentives in evidence collection are shown to be increasing in a judge’s effort to process information. Diverting limited judicial resources to collect information, then, may generate multiple equilibria with different resource allocations. An equilibrium with more judicial resources devoted to information collection is accompanied with fewer resources for understanding, and thus lower private search effort. Unless the search capacity of the court is sufficiently high, public search will reduce the overall quality of judicial decision making. The model is also extended to consider whether a judge should disclose his “inner conviction” (心證), captured as the interim belief, before litigants present their evidence to the court. Disclosure is socially optimal under a general sufficient condition, namely, the first-order effect of the belief on private search dominates the second-order effect.