經驗的意向性及客觀性是麥道爾《心靈與世界》一書的論述主軸，本文首先探索並界定出麥道爾用以支持經驗的意向性及客觀性的理據，而以這個理據為基礎，進一步建構一個麥道爾式的自我理論。更具體的說，本文進行兩個論證：第一，我們可以將麥道爾對於經驗客觀性的保證，擴展成對於智性生活及規範的客觀性之保證。第二，在麥道爾相關論述中，特別是他為客觀性所提供的理據中，蘊涵了一個關於自我的圖像，而在這個圖像中，自我不僅是一個體現在經驗世界中的自我，同時也必須是一個在理性空間中擁有智性生活的自我。

This paper ventures to propose a McDowellian account of self by articulating a rationale underpinning McDowell’s conception of self. The rationale identified and explored is also the one McDowell offers for the objectivity and intentionality of experience, which is the coordinating theme that McDowell explores in Mind and World. More specifically, I advocate two theses: (1) McDowell’s assurance on the objectivity of experience can be extended to the objectivity of our “intellectual life” and the norms governing our ways of thinking and doing. (2) McDowell’s assurance would endorse or, at least strongly suggest, a conception of self in which a self has to be conceived not only as an embodied self in the empirical world, but also as a self with intellectual life in the realm of reasons. This is a kind of hybrid view on self, but the hybrid account McDowell would endorse is much richer than a mere inseparability of one’s consciousness and one’s body. It is in fact saying that it is impossible to isolate oneself from one’s body (hence the empirical world in which it resides), one’s personal intellectual life (created by self-decisions in responding to the demands issued by the space of reason and those imposed by the empirical world) and the space of reason created socially and cumulated historically.