泰勒主張黑格爾企圖綜合康德的思想與表現理論，從而將實在的整體視為以理性的自我認知為本質的無限精神。依據其闡釋，表現理論包涵了形質論與自我界定兩個向度。本文指出：在其黑格爾詮釋中，泰勒忽略了自我界定的向度。本文嘗試以一種特殊的類與殊種的關係說明黑格爾的辯證，指出辯證的思維所要呈現的，正是人類精神的自我界定，黑格爾視之為精神的自由。這樣子理解的辯證固然難以把握自然世界的結構，然而本文並不認為黑格爾的哲學系統具有一個統一的辯證觀念，是以也並未意圖提出能夠涵蓋其系統整體的辯證觀念。

Charles Taylor claims that, intending to synthesize Kant’s philosophy and expressivism, Hegel grasped the totality of reality as the infinite spirit whose essence is rational self-knowledge. According to Taylor, expressivism has two dimensions: hylomorphism and self-definition. It is argued in this paper that Taylor actually ignores the dimension of self-definition in his interpretation of Hegel. Taylor claims that Hegel holds the totality of reality to be a process of development. Yet he grasps the development as the process of the realization of a form the content of which remains unchanged (the dimension of hylomorphism) but not as the becoming of the content of the form to be realized in the process of development (the dimension of self-definition). This is because Taylor lays emphasis on the idea of the unity of nature and man while appealing to expressivism to expound Hegel’s philosophy. Since Hegel does not think that nature changes, Taylor thinks that he takes human nature to be given and unchanged. This paper attempts to expound Hegel’s idea of dialectic in terms of a specific relation between genus and species. It is argued that dialectic presents the self-definition of the human spirit, which is for Hegel the freedom of the spirit. Understood in this way, dialectic admittedly cannot present the structure of nature. Yet this paper does not think that there is a unified idea of dialectic underlying Hegel’s system and has no intention to suggest an idea of dialectic that would cover the whole of his system.