理性關乎理由，即要求一個人的態度正確回應他的理由，還是關乎融貫性，即要求他的態度保持恰當的結構關係呢？相容論理性觀主張二者都是理性的內涵，分別稱之為實質理性與結構理性。相容論的挑戰有二。首先，Broome區分了理性與規範性，他將實質理性歸入規範性並將規範性排除在理性之外。我將論證Broome並不反對將實質理性納入廣義的理性觀念之中，據此我搬掉了反駁相容論的一塊基石。其次，相容論的另一挑戰在於結構理性和實質理性的相互衝突。立足於Grice以推理求理性的思想，我將回應該挑戰。

Is rationality a matter of responding correctly to the reasons one has, or a matter of coherence, i.e., having the right structural relations hold between one’s attitudes? A compatible idea on rationality asserts that both of them embodies in the very idea of rationality, called as substantive and structural rationality. This compatible idea has twofold challenges. Firstly, Broome sees rationality just as structural rationality, equates substantive rationality with normativity，and then expels normativity from rationality. I argue that there existed swing statements in Broome’s formulation on rationality, which shows that he might acknowledge substantive rationality could be a constitute of rationality in a broad sense. This removes an important cornerstone against this compatible idea. Secondly, another challenge is that, there exist possible conflicts between substantive and structural rationality. By Grice’s discussion on rationality through reasoning, I will response this challenge.