在康德(Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804)哲學中，Menschheit一詞大概是最容易被誤解的用語之一。中譯本往往將它譯為「人性」，而與Menschennatur相混淆。英譯本往往將它譯為humanity，而與Humanität (=Menschlichkeit)相混淆。在《道德底形上學之基礎》中，Menschheit一詞指涉作為「目的自身」的人，或者說，道德主體。在絕大多數情況下，康德都是依此意義使用Menschheit一詞。這個意義的Menschheit屬於道德底形上學之超經驗層面，而「人性」(die menschliche Natur/Menschennatur)則屬於人類學之經驗層面，兩者不可混淆。但在康德的著作中，Menschheit一詞的使用卻有一個例外。這個例外出現於《單在理性界限內的宗教》一書中。在該書中，康德提到三種「在人性中向善的原始稟賦」，其中第二種便是關於人（作為一個有生命且同時有理性的存有者）底人情性(Menschheit)的稟賦。這種稟賦根源於「儘管是自然的、但卻是比較性的我愛」，它需要技術性的實踐理性。這種「我愛」可追溯到盧梭(Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1778)所說的amourpropre，它具有文化創造的意涵。盧梭將amour propre視為人類的墮落與不幸之根源，但康德卻將人情性視為文化創造的動力，並藉此建立其文化哲學。在其《判斷力批判》中，康德指出：文化使人類成為「自然之最後目的」。自然之「最後目的」屬於自然目的論。但是「自然目的論」並非一個自足的系統，它必須預設一個「終極目的」，從而提升到「道德目的論」。這個「終極目的」即是作為道德主體的Menschheit。藉由Menschheit一詞的雙重涵義，康德的文化哲學與道德哲學結合成一個更完整的系統。

In the philosophy of Kant (1724-1804), the term “Menschheit” is probably one of the most misunderstood terms. Chinese translators often translate it as renxing (人性, human nature), which is confused with Kant’s term “Menschennatur.” English translators often translate it as “humanity,” which is confused with Kant’s term “Humanität” (=Menschlichkeit). In Kant’s work Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the term “Menschheit” refers to the person as “end in itself,” or the moral subject. In most cases, Kant uses the term “Menschheit” in this sense. “Menschheit” in this sense belongs to the trans-empirical level of the metaphysics of morals, while “human nature” belongs to the empirical level of anthropology. The two cannot be confused. But in Kant’s writings, there is an exception to this use of the term “Menschheit.” This exception appears in his work Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Here Kant mentions three kinds of “original predisposition to good in human nature,” the second of which is the predisposition to the “Menschheit” in humans as living and at the same time rational beings. This predisposition originates in “physical and yet comparing self-love,” for which technical practical reason is required. This “self-love” can be traced back to Rousseau’s (1712-1778) “amour propre” and has the meaning of cultural creation. Rousseau regarded “amour propre” as the source of human degeneration and misfortune, whereas Kant regarded “Menschheit” in human nature as the driving force for cultural creation and established his cultural philosophy accordingly. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant pointed out that culture makes human beings “the final purpose of nature.” The “final purpose of nature” belongs to natural teleology. But “natural teleology” is not a self-sufficient system. It must presuppose an “ultimate purpose” in order to be elevated to “moral teleology.” This “ultimate purpose” is just “Menschheit” as moral subject. With the dual meaning of the term “Menschheit,” Kant’s cultural philosophy and moral philosophy are combined into a more complete system.