Conatus（自我保存的努力）在斯賓諾莎《倫理學》裡面是一個基礎性的但同時在理解上又爭議很大的一個概念。很多學者認為它的內涵在《倫理學》的前後部分是不一致甚至是相互矛盾的。前者是非目的論的，後者是目的論的。本文試圖論證斯賓諾莎始終保持了conatus概念的核心內涵，但同時又提供了一種發展的視角。它既非完全同一，但也並非矛盾，而是同一個事物的不同發展階段。在純粹心靈追求神的知識這一個維度上，conatus的內涵被提升到了一個新的層面，但其自保的核心始終沒有改變。它們都適用於非目的論的解釋。

Conatus is a fundamental but also controversial concept in Spinoza’s Ethics. Many scholars believe that its meaning is inconsistent or even contradictory in first and second half of the Ethics. The former is non-teleological, the latter is teleological. This paper attempts to demonstrate that Spinoza has always maintained the core meaning of the concept of conatus, but at the same time provides a developmental perspective. In the dimension of pure mind pursuit of God’s knowledge, conatus’ meaning has been elevated to a new level, but the core meaning of self-preservation has never changed. They both apply to non-teleological explanations.