「現象與物自身的先驗區分」對於康德的研究者而言是一個相當有爭議性的議題，當代康德學者對於這個問題的爭論是集中在「兩個世界觀點」(Ameriks)以及「兩個面相觀點」(Allison)。根據「兩個世界觀點」，現象和物自身是存有論上兩種不同的實在物，前者是感性對象而後者是超感性對象；而根據「兩個面相觀點」，現象和物自身是對於同一個經驗對象在認識論上不同的兩個面相。透過海德格《康德與形上學問題》一書的影響，牟宗三在《智的直覺與中國哲學》(1971)一書開始對於康德的詮釋便集中在「兩個面相觀點」的路線。之後在《現象與物自身》(1975)一書中嘗試批判康德的「兩個面相觀點」之版本，同時發展自己的版本與康德對抗。本文嘗試整理牟宗三反對康德的版本所使用的論證，並且評價牟宗三自己的版本。

Kant’s doctrine of the transcendental distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves is a controversial theme in the interpretation of Kant’s system. The contemporary discussion of this problem among Kant’s scholars is divided into two different positions between the “two-world view” (Ameriks) and the “two-aspect view” (Allison). According to the “two-world view” appearances and things-in-themselves are ontologically distinct entities in that the former is sensible and the latter supersensible object; while according to the “two-aspect view” appearances and things-in-themselves are two aspects of one and the same empirical object. Mou Zongsan began to focus his Kant’s interpretation in direction of the “two-aspect view” in Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (1971) through the influence of Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. In Appearance and Things-in-themselves(1975) Mou tried to criticize Kant’s versions of the “two-aspect view” and develop his own version. This paper attempts to summarize Mou’s arguments against Kant’s versions and also evaluate Mou’s own version.