本文建立一個混合寡占模型，探討一家部分民營化的公營廠商及一家純民營廠商進行價格與數量競爭時福利水準的高低。我們的研究結果發現，給定公營廠商部分民營化下，兩家廠商從事數量競爭時的社會福利會較價格競爭爲高。此一發現與過去文獻中公營廠商爲純公（民）營時，廠商進行價格競爭下的社會福利較數量競爭下高的結果有很大的不同。

Considering partial privatization of a public firm, this paper investigates the relative merits in terms of welfare between the Bertrand and Cournot outcomes in a mixed duopoly. To our surprise, social welfare may be higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand if the public firm is partially privatized. This result stands in stark contrast to the previous literature, which asserts that Bertrand competition is socially more desirable than Cournot if the public firm is completely privatized or completely state-owned.