為了評估邏輯例外論，我們需要明確（i）一般意義上的知識概念，（ii）具體意義上的邏輯概念，以及（iii）我們評估邏輯例外論的相關參數。在具體說明這些之後，我從兩個方面評估了邏輯例外論：（a）邏輯是否與經驗科學是相連續的，（b）邏輯是否在一般性、形式性、基礎性、先驗性、分析性和必然性等方面區別於其它領域。我的結論是，邏輯在某些方面是例外的，在其他方面則不是例外的。邏輯與包括經驗科學在內的其他知識領域類似，它立足於世界，致力於真理，是發現性的，是可修正的，而不是分析性的、純粹先驗的或傳統基礎主義意義上的基礎性的。但它又區別於大多數知識領域，包括經驗科學，因為它是形式性的、有高度的必然性、一般性、是準先驗的，雖不具有基礎主義的基礎性，但具有整體主義意義上的基礎性。

To evaluate the exceptionality of logic, we need to specify (i) a conception of knowledge in general, (ii) a conception of logic in particular, and (iii) parameters with respect to which we evaluate logic’s exceptionality. After specifying these things, I evaluate the exceptionality of logic in two senses: (a) whether logic is continuous with the empirical sciences, (b) whether logic differs from other fields with respect to the features traditionally attributed to it: generality, formality, foundationality, apriority, analyticity, and necessity. My conclusion is that logic is exceptional in some ways, unexceptional in others. Logic is similar to other fields of knowledge, including the empirical sciences, in being grounded in the world, committed to truth, engaged in discovery, open to revision, and not being analytic, purely apriori, or foundational in the traditional foundationalist sense. But it differs from most fields, including the empirical sciences, in being formal, highly necessary, general, quasiapriori, and foundational, though in a holistic, non-foundationalist, sense.