基於莊學之形而上思維與人觀，本研究問題面臨以下詮釋挑戰：個體死亡在大化流行之場域中如何獲得概念上的安置？人在死後是否存在，以及此存在之去向為何？時間性如何決定處喪之意義？本文以「合宜性」之考慮，從莊學視域出發，以探索人在情感上應當如何回應他人死亡之問題。參酌當代喪慟觀與當代死亡哲學之問題意識與重要觀點，本文在「觀化者—物化」之關係性中，以莊學式的禮意為根據，說明處喪中的情感之意向性對象及其基本性格、合宜情感之理據，以及生者在情感上如何向他人死亡致意並完成自我表意。文獻回顧方面，本文反省個體死亡在系統性形上學中遭匿名化之傾向(Roger T. Ames)，並且在情感觀方面彌補情感理據與合宜性在說明上的缺失(Amy Olberding, David Wong, Chris Fraser)。

Given the Zhuangzian perspectives on metaphysics and personhood, this essay considers three major interpretative challenges: how to conceptually locate personal death in transformation-of-thing; whether a person exists after death and just what is this existence; and how does the Zhuangzian conception of temporality determine the meaning of mourning? From the consideration of “fittingness,” the essay investigates the emotions appropriate when faced with the death of another person. Drawing on theoretical perspectives and findings in the contemporary philosophy of emotion and philosophy of death, the essay accounts for the intentional object of emotion and its basic character, the appropriate basis for the fit emotion, and how one ethically recognizes the death of a person, thereby accomplishing the process of self-expression. Through a literature review, the essay critically reflects on ways in which a systematic metaphysics tends to dismiss ordinary references to death (e.g. Roger T. Ames) and remedies insufficient accounts of fitting emotion (e.g. Amy Olberding, David Wong and Chris Fraser).