法院組織法第57 條刪除前之判例制度業經廢止，從法學方法論與立法目的來看，立法者係在以大法庭制度取代判例制度，並非係以大法庭制度接續判例制度關於形成終審法院統一法律見解之功能。判例制度廢止之後，刑事妥速審判法第9 條第1 項第3 款所定「判決違背判例」，因第二審法院維持第一審所為無罪判決，而提起第三審上訴之理由，已無適用之餘地。缺乏具體的法定授權，檢察官無權對有利於被告之無罪判決提起第三審上訴，而以法官造法之方式，擴張解釋將違背「依徵詢或大法庭裁定見解所為之判決先例」，視同違背判例，允許檢察官依此種擴張解釋之方法，開啟另一扇重複追訴與審判之門，已無異於以法官造法之方式取代立法權，侵犯被告受實質意義雙重危險禁止原則所保障之憲法訴訟權。

The Precedent System was abolished before the deletion of Article 57 of the Court Organizational Act. From the perspectives of the methodology of jurisprudence and the purpose of the above-mentioned legislation, the legislators aimed at replacing the Precedent System with the Grand Chamber System instead of applying Grand Chamber System to further reach consistent legal opinions in the final court trials following the procedures of the Precedent System. After the Precedent System was abolished, “the judgement in contradiction to the precedent” specified in Article 9.1.3 of the Criminal Speedy Trial Act shall be no longer applicable as a reason to appeal to the third instance when the court of the second instance upholds the not guilty judgement rendered by the first instance. Without a concrete legal license, prosecutors have no rights to appeal to the third instance against the not guilty judgement in favor of a defendant. Judge-made law is instead applied to further explain that the violation against “precedent cases pursuant to opinions rendered after consulting or grand chamber rulings” is considered being in contradiction to the precedent. Such extended explanation opens another door for prosecutors to repeated prosecution and trial. And this condition already implies the replacement of the legislative power with judge-made law, which infringes on the defendant’s constitutional right of access to the courts protected by the principle of double jeopardy.