戴震思想在檢討宋明理學的不合理中形成，為對治「理」的形上化、專制化，他重新詮釋經典，試圖從自然人性的立場，綰合理、欲，建立符合經驗世界的道德理論，規劃出一條「自然」歸於「必然」的成德理路。然而，他「理存乎欲」的主張，引起了情欲的主觀性能否作為道德依據的質疑，而工夫論上，他所強調的「德性資於學問」，亦有知識和道德本質不同的轉換問題。關於這些詰難，在引入亞里士多德倫理學後得到了進一步的論證。亞氏立基自然人性和經驗事實，認為道德和情欲，知識與德性，乃統合於人性之中。由於天生的道德稟賦，人得以通過對幸福的想望約制情欲，發揮理智整合知識與行動，從中發展出道德生活。因此，適度的情欲表現正是德性的印證，德性與欲望並非對立關係。而在實踐理智的運作下，德性的善與知識的真，得以相通相融。通過亞氏倫理學的視角，使戴震理、欲關係在道德活動中的運作得以豁顯，進而證立由「自然」歸於「必然」的主張。如此，以往戴震思想備受質疑之處，在取徑亞氏倫理學重新思考後，得到了相對同情的理解。

Dai Zhen’s thought was formed in the review of the irrationality of Song and Ming theories. In order to combat the formalization and authoritarianization of “Li”（理）, he reinterpreted the classics and attempted to establish a moral theory with the empirical world from the standpoint of natural human nature, and to establish a theory of morality that is consistent with the empirical world, and to chart a path of “nature” to “necessity” for the attainment of virtue. However, his assertion that “ Li exists in desire”（理存乎欲）raises the question of whether the subjectivity of desire can serve as a basis for morality, and his emphasis on “morality is informed by learning”（德性資於學問） also raises the question of the conversion of knowledge and moral essence. These interrogations are explained by reference to Aristotle’s ethics. Based on natural human nature and empirical facts, Aristotle argues that morality and lust, knowledge and virtue, are united in human nature, and that by virtue of one’s innate moral gifts, one is able to exercise one’s faculties to restrain lust and one’s reason to integrate knowledge and action, thereby developing a moral life. The contradictory and questionable aspects of Dai Zhen’s thought can be sympathetically understood through a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s view.