對於中共領導人在權力繼承或幹部管理相關討論中，學者多從制度化的角度來檢視之。本文認為在中共的政治法規，包括黨內法規與國家法律，在涉及幹部選拔或政策決定的相關規定時，其主要的目的是在實踐黨與國家在一定時期的歷史任務，及最高領導人的理念。因此，相對於西方的制度化的理論，中共更慣之引用的是辯證邏輯。由於列寧體制本質的缺陷，使得中共的政治法規很難產生憲政主義的制衡功能。一旦最高領導人的理念出現改變，再加上黨內並不存在與之抗衡的派系，使得原先規範容易被破壞。從這個面向來看，習近平蓄意延續政權的理念，且黨內欠缺足以與習抗衡的派系，使得幹部繼承與管理等相關規範受到習的破壞。

Scholars have mostly examined the discussion of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders’ power succession or cadre management from an institutionalized perspective. This article argues that the main purpose for the political regulations of the CCP, including party regulations and national laws, when it comes to the selection of cadres or policy decisions, is to fulfill the historical tasks of the party and the country in a certain period of time, and to practice the idea of supreme leadership. Therefore, compared with Western institutionalized theories, the CCP is more accustomed to citing dialectical logic. Due to the inherent defects of Lenin’s system, it is difficult for the CCP’s political regulations to produce the check and balance function of constitutionalism. Once the idea of the top leader changes, coupled with the fact that there are no factions in the party to contend with it, the original norms are easily destroyed. From this point of view, Xi Jinping deliberately perpetuates the ideals of the regime, and the lack of factions within the party capable of competing with Xi Jinping has caused Xi to undermine relevant norms such as cadre succession and management.