本文考慮兩團隊競逐一個固定價值獎品之雇傭代理模型。 此獎品之真正價值對兩隊都相同，但只有兩隊之代理人才知道。兩隊之委託人則只知道其值可能為高或低，並不知道其真正價值。因此，兩隊之委託人有兩種可能策略：「親為」是指委託人親自下海付出一定成本以獲得此標的獎品之價值資訊，而「授權」則是授權給代理人出面為其競爭此獎品。我們發現，當資訊獲取成本和獎品高低值差距皆很大時，只有一個委託人會採取「授權」的方式。然而，從社會福利的角度，兩人都「授權」才是較佳的選擇。

This research considers the situation where there are two teams, each of which is composed of a principal and an agent, competing in a contest with a prize that has a common value. The value of the prize is uncertain to the principal and can be either high or low, while the agent knows such information. A principal has two methods to acquire information: selfinvestigation, where the principal acquires information by herself; and delegation, where she delegates the contest right to the agent who competes on her behalf. We find that when the gap in the prize values is relatively large and the cost of information acquisition is relatively small, both principals adopt self-investigation in equilibrium, while if both the gap in the prize values and the cost of information acquisition are sufficiently large then delegation by one of the principals can be an equilibrium. However, there is no equilibrium when both principals delegate, even though it is socially optimal for them to do so.