早期海德格將此在之諸般存有可能性區分為本真狀態與非本真狀態，並且宣稱這兩種存有模式之間實無等級差別。儘管如此，此一區分在存有學上實已蘊含了一種有條件的價值判斷，亦即：當事情涉及到理解存有之意義時，則存有者越是源初的，其就越是好的。筆者企圖指出，早期海德格的哲學是有可能基於這種存有價值來發展出一套規範倫理學理論——縱使他實際上從未如此做過、甚至還反對這麼做。為達成此一任務，本文首先將釐清此一議題所涉及的概念，接著則是去分析早期海德格哲學中隱含的存有價值。第三節是透過海德格的現象學方法來闡明早期海德格是如何將「倫理學」理解為主體哲學控制下的一門學科。第四節透過梳理本真此在的生存論結構分析，以澄清海德格所謂的生存論式唯我論之意含。最後一節則是指出，吾人是有可能發展出一套基於這種生存論式唯我論的德性倫理學，唯這種倫理學理論並不同於亞里斯多德及沙特的倫理學。

Early Heidegger classified Dasein’s possibilities of Being into authenticity and inauthenticity, and declared that there is no hierarchical difference between these two modes of Being. Nevertheless, this distinction eventually contains an ontologically conditional value judgment as follows: The more primordial is a mode of Being, the better it is, when it comes to understanding the meaning of Being. The author attempts to point out that early Heidegger’s philosophy is able to develop a normative ethical theory based on this ontological value – even though he never actually did it, and even opposed to doing so. In order to complete this task, this paper first clarifies the concepts involved in this topic, and then analyzes the ontological value implicit in early Heidegger's philosophy. The third section of this paper explains how early Heidegger regards “ethics” as a discipline under the control of subjectism through Heidegger's phenomenological method. The fourth section explains the meaning of Heidegger's so-called existential solipsism by analyzing the existential structure of the authentic Dasein. The last section points out that it is possible for us to develop a kind of virtue ethics based on this existential solipsism, although this ethical theory is different from Aristotle’s and Sartre’s.