過去研究發現集團企業可能藉由移轉訂價操控，進行集團企業間之所得移轉，以規避稅負或操弄公司盈餘。我國於2016年開始實施新式查核報告以提升查核報告透明度，但會計師責任及訴訟風險可能增加，此可能影響會計師對於財務報表之查核行為以及公司管理當局對於財務報表操控行為，而可能影響企業之移轉訂價操控行為。本研究推論實施新式查核報告後，會計師責任及訴訟風險增加而使其相對受查企業而言，對於會計數字談判力量增強，故能抑制企業移轉訂價操控行為。本研究使用Lo, Wong, and Firth（2010）；陳明進、蔡麗雯（2010）之移轉訂價偏離常規交易差異數來衡量公司之操控移轉訂價程度，再者，本研究以關鍵查核事項揭露項目數來捕抓實施新式查核報告之效果，並以實施新式查核報告之2016～2019台灣上市（櫃）公司為樣本，進行實證研究。實證結果顯示簽證會計師在查核報告中揭露較多項關鍵查核事項項目，會對企業與聯屬企業間不合常規移轉訂價交易有抑制作用。

Prior studies have found that affiliated companies manipulate transfer price to shift income and reduce their taxes or manipulate earnings. The Taiwan audit regulator recently introduced a new audit report requirement for all public companies with fiscal year-ends on or after December 31, 2016, which requires auditors to describe key audit matters that had the greatest effect on the audit. The new audit report may enhance the transparency of the audit, thus increase the auditor’s responsibility and litigation risk, and in turn, enhance their bargaining power regarding accounting number, including transfer price. This study aims to explore the effect of new audit report on firms’ transfer price manipulation. Following Lo, Wong, and Firth (2010) and Chen and Tsai (2010), this study uses an indicator based on the deviation between firms’ gross margin rate and normal gross margin rate to proxy firms’ transfer price manipulation. The number of key audit matters is used to capture the effect of the new audit report, and Taiwan listed firms during 2016~2019 are used for the empirical study. The empirical results show that disclosing more key audit matters does constrain the firms’ transfer price manipulation behavior.