在本文中，我將會辯護某個版本的模態懷疑論。我將會論證，我們對於形上模態的信念，若是超出了物理模態與邏輯模態的範圍，那麼會是很難可以有認知上的證成。因此在這意義上，我們不會對於專屬於形上模態的真理擁有知識。在本文的第一節簡單地釐清「形上模態」與「模態知識」等概念後，在本文第二節我將會簡短地檢視模態知識論的主要進路，包括可設想性進路（Yablo 1993）、反事實進路（Williamson 2007）、與本質論進路（Lowe 2012）等。我將會說明，為何我不認為這些進路能夠成功地提供所謂的形上模態知識。在本文的第三節，我將會談到我對模態懷疑論更為積極的辯護。我將會論證，雖然我們的形上模態信念，在我們對世界進行理論化與哲學化的過程中扮演了不可或缺的角色，但這樣的角色並不需要這些信念是在認知上被證成的。這表示，就算我們沒有形上模態知識，這也不會是一個嚴重的問題。

In this paper, I will defend a version of modal scepticism. I will argue that we have no epistemic justification for our beliefs of metaphysical modality beyond physical and logical modalities, and in this sense we should have no knowledge of distinctively metaphysical modality. After briefly clarifying the notions of ‘metaphysical modality’ and ‘modal knowledge’ in the first section, I will examine the main approaches to modal epistemology in the second section, including the conceivability approach (Yablo 1993), the counterfactual approach (Williamson 2007), and the essentialist approach (Lowe 2012). I will explain why I do not think these approaches can provide us with the alleged knowledge of metaphysical modality. In the third section, I will talk about my positive defence for modal scepticism. I will argue that although our beliefs of metaphysical modality do play an indispensable role in our theorizing and philosophizing, these beliefs do not need to be epistemically justified in order to play such a role. This means that there will be no problem even if we do not have knowledge of metaphysical modality.