Saul Kripke在《命名與必然性》第一版（1972）中，提出了「物理必然性」或「理論同一性」是否「最高程度」必然性的問題，但至該書第二版（1980）問題依舊，此後也一直未給出明確答案。本文分析表明，該問題之所以長期得不到解答，乃因為Kripke的模態本質主義思想體系尚未走出自我解構之困境。而從「偶然性逃逸疑難」——正規模態集合論悖論的分析中，可以引申出實體—實體關聯與實體—屬性關聯的根本差異；作為模態本質主義之立足點的非邏輯必然性與偶然性的區分，只有相對於實體—屬性關聯才有意義。本文據此為Kripke「物理必然性」疑難提供了一種基於物理必然性陳述「雙重語義」的解答方案，這不僅能使Kripke思想體系歸於融貫，而且可為當代模態認識論及模態邏輯研究提供多方面啟迪。

Saul Kripke raised the question of whether “physical necessity”, or “theoretical identity”, is the necessity in the highest degree in his Naming and Necessity published in 1972, but it remained unsolved in the second edition (1980), and no definitive answer has ever been given since then. This paper shows that this was because Kripke’s conception of modal essentialism had not yet stepped out of the dilemma of self-deconstruction. The author demonstrates that the fundamental difference of “entity-entity connection” and “entity-attribute connection” can be derived if we examine the analysis of the “contingent escape puzzle”: The Paradox of Normal Modal Set Theory. The distinction of non-logical necessity and contingent on which modal essentialism stands is only meaningful with respect to entity-attribute connection. The author presents a solution to Kripke’s Puzzle of “Physical Necessity” based on the “dual meaning” of the physical necessity statement, which could not only make Kripke’s conception coherent, but also hopefully shed lights to contemporary studies on modal epistemology and modal logic.