反例式思想實驗是用以顯示某個形上學必然論題為假，就如何證立哲學論題，本文探究思想實驗對哲學理論化的正面知態角色。運用思想實驗的直覺判斷(﹁ψ1)以反駁給定論題，在於此論題滿足了後述形式要求：If φ is ψ, then if φ1 (/ψ1), one can see in a non-empirical way that ψ1 (/φ1), where φ1 and ψ1 are instances of φ and ψ respectively。除了論證深層理解(deep understanding)無法證立哲學論題，本文基於形式要求的滿足，討論可行的策略：逆推考量(the Abduction)與實用考量(the Pragmatic)。二個策略都無法提供直接證成，而只能是相較於競爭對手的合理選擇；此外，本文論證為何實用考量，才能最佳說明思想實驗對於哲學理論化的知態貢獻。

Counterexample thought experiments (hereafter thought experiments) are the usual way to show false some philosophical theses that are proposed as necessarily true. This paper explores a positive epistemic role for thought experiments in philosophical theorising. At least in most cases, the rationale of employing the intuitive judgement of a thought experiment, say, ﹁ψ1, against a target thesis is that it satisfies the formal requirement of the Non-empirical Instance: If φ is ψ, then if φ1 (/ψ1), one can see in a non-empirical way that ψ1 (/φ1), where φ1 and ψ1 are instances of φ and ψ, respectively (section I). This paper shows why deep understanding (or general intuition) does not do any non-empirical justificatory work to support substantive philosophical theses (section II). It then analyses the two most promising strategies for non-empirical justification: the Abduction and the Pragmatic (sections III & IV). These strategies involve adopting a weaker notion of intuition that is suitable for judging particular thought experiment cases non-empirically. The non-empirical justification they render to (most) substantive philosophical theses can be put as follows: Given the presupposition that a substantive philosophical thesis can be defended successfully against thought experimentation, such a thesis is only justified non-empirically in that it is rational to choose it, in contrast to its rivals, because it deals with relevant thoughtful challenges better. This paper presents a reason why general intuitions should not do essential justificatory work to support substantive philosophical theses by analysing the positive role of thought experimentation (section V).